Products Liability - Real Property - Builder-Vendors by Sokol, Stephen M.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 8 Number 2 Article 8 
1970 
Products Liability - Real Property - Builder-Vendors 
Stephen M. Sokol 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stephen M. Sokol, Products Liability - Real Property - Builder-Vendors, 8 Duq. L. Rev. 407 (1970). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol8/iss2/8 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Case Comment
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-REAL PROPERTY-BUILDER-VENDORS-The Court
of Appeals of California has held that the doctrine of strict liability
applies to home builders and that privity of contract is no longer
required to maintain the action.
Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
This case of first impression arose upon injuries to the property of
a homeowner when the radiant heating system of the home failed.
The home had been constructed by the defendant, Eichler Homes, Inc.
in 1951 and was then sold to the Kriegler's predecessors in title. The
home was purchased in 1957 by the plaintiff Kriegler. Due to a
shortage of copper tubing during the Korean War, Eichler's plumbing
sub-contractor had installed steel tubing in the heating system. The
system was installed according to ordinary procedures, and the in-
stallation was inspected and approved by the F.H.A. inspectors. In
November, 1959 the system failed as a result of corrosion to the steel
tubing and the entire system was replaced. The emergency repairs to
the system required removal and storage of the furniture as well as
temporary shelter for Kriegler and his family.
The trial court found that due to Eichler's negligence, Kriegler
suffered damages amounting to over $5,000 and that regardless of
negligence, Eichler was liable to Kriegler in the above amount on a
theory of strict liability. At the trial and appellate stages, Eichler
raised the defense that the common law has never applied the doc-
trine of strict liability to homes or builders. In this contention, Eichler
raised a time-honored defense, but the California Court of Appeals
chose to dispense with the ancient rule of law that owners and
builders of real property could not be held strictly liable for injuries
occurring on such property. The California Court recognized that
the doctrine of strict liability had previously been applied only to
manufacturers and retailers of personal property, however, it could
find no meaningful distinction between the manufacturer of mass-
produced chattels and the builder of mass-produced homes which
would justify continued limitation of the doctrine.
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HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE
Prior to 1916, the general rule of law extended negligent liability
of sellers of chattels only to the most immediate seller of that chattel.
The law required privity of contract between the injured party and
the negligent manufacturer or seller in order to recover. The rule
requiring privity was changed in the decision of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.' In the same case, liability was extended to types of manu-
facturers formerly held immune. The suit arose after the defendant,
Buick Motor Co., had sold one of its automobiles to the plaintiff,
MacPherson. While driving the car, one of the wooden-spoked wheels
suddenly collapsed and the plaintiff was injured. Although the wheel
was produced by another reputable manufacturer, the Court of Ap-
peals of New York, per Mr. Justice Cardozo, held defendant Buick
responsible for the finished product. There was no claim in the case
that the defendant knew of the defect and willingly concealed it.
The court stated that a producer would be held for his negligence
to subsequent purchasers of his product if the product is that type
which is reasonably certain to place persons in peril when negligently
made. The MacPherson decision, however, did more than extend
liability to producers of inherently dangerous articles. The reasoning
behind the decision was clearly a break with the older notion that
a seller's liability to his purchaser was based upon contract. The
manufacturer, by placing such articles on the general market, assumes
the responsibility for any foreseeable harm to consumers. The action
is clearly one in tort and not contract. Hence, privity of contract,
that is, a contractual relationship between the manufacturer and the
buyer, was no longer required in an action against the manufacturer.
The result of this decision was to enable the ultimate purchaser in
a chain of purchasers to sue the manufacturer and possibly recover. 2
With this new rule which placed liability upon the negligent manu-
facturer of chattels, it was logical to further extend the principle of
ordinary negligence of MacPherson to a principle of strict liability.
This movement began to develop in 1905 in agitation over the mar-
keting of defective foods.8 The first decisions imposing strict liability
without privity of contract were applied to cases in this area. In the
1950's and '60's, the application of the doctrine was extended beyond
1. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 395 (1934).
3. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 97, at 673 (3d ed. 1964).
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products inherently dangerous to bodily use. Courts began to hold
manufacturers of such items as grinding-wheels, automobiles, tires,
and chairs strictly liable, and without requiring privity. 4 The move-
ment in this area is not yet complete but it can be generally said that
the courts have dispensed with the requirement of privity and have
been liberal in imposing strict liability upon manufacturers of chat-
tels. Introduction of these concepts has been slow, however, in the law
of real property.
THE MACPHERSON DOCTRINE EXCLUDED REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS
It is important to note that the MacPherson decision dealt solely
with chattels. Persons involved in the manufacture, sale or lease of
real property, no matter how negligent, were generally excluded
from any liability to remote vendees. Ordinarily, therefore, the vendor
who becomes separated from title and possession is allowed to step out
of the picture completely and shift all liability to the present owner
or occupier of the property. Two exceptions have since been applied
to this general rule: (1) where injuries result from a latent defect
which the vendor knew (or, in some cases, should have known) to
exist but which he failed to disclose to the vendee and (2) where
injuries were sustained upon property which in itself presented an
unreasonable risk of harm to those outside of the premises. 5
In sales of real property, the courts have traditionally held that all
preliminary negotiations must be merged into the deed if they are
to be given any legal effect. The contract of sale controls only until
the deed is given and any liability based upon the seller's promises
during the period of negotiation leading to the contract of sale will
be precluded unless the deed contains such promises. Section 352 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that a vendor of real estate
is not subject to the liability for physical injuries of subsequent
purchasers or to third persons by a dangerous condition, natural or
artificial, except in such instances :hat the dangerous condition is
undisclosed to the purchaser, yet known to the seller. In a note to
section. 352, the reporter states that the ancient doctrine of caveat
emptor still retains much of its original force in the area of real
4. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 35 P.2d 575, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863
(1960); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Circ 1959).
5. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 62, at 409 (3d ed. 1964).
409
Duquesne Law Review
property sales. While the truth of this statement cannot be doubted,
the decided trend of today's decisions, as exemplified by the case
under consideration, is to make a distinction when the vendor is
also the builder of the home. In some of these decisions, as will be
discussed in more detail, the deed has not been regarded with the
customary deference. Whether so obliged by the terms of the deed
or not, in more recent years, the builder-vendor has been held for
his defective work after surrender of title and possession on one or
more theories: (1) an ordinary negligence theory such as that stated in
MacPherson; (2) implied warranty; or (3) strict liability. The following
pages will discuss the historical evolution from an invariable rule of
non-liability of vendors of real estate, to a modern trend which goes
beyond imposing ordinary liability for negligence and imposes a stan-
dard of strict liability on the builder-vendor.
It is difficult to explain exactly why the policy considerations be-
hind the notions of ordinary negligence, strict liability, and privity
of contract pre-MacPherson have taken so long to die in the area of
real property transactions. Indeed, it seems that only tenuous distinc-
tions can be drawn between a manufacturer of chattels and a manu-
facturer of houses, especially if both produce prefabricated products
for a mass market. Both seem to have similar attributes, in manner of
manufacturing as well as of marketing. One, then, may validly ques-
tion why the similarities have not been to compel identical standards
of liability.
The question of duty has been crucial here, for although the courts
recognized that the builder-vendor may have caused the injury, they
rationalized the rule of non-liability by simply not recognizing a duty
of the vendor to use reasonable care. As no such duty was attached,
negligence could not be imputed to the vendor; the elements required
by tort law to establish negligence were simply not present.
THE MACPHERSON DOCTRINE Is Now MAJORITY
As the period prior to the MacPherson decision witnessed an inev-
itable drift toward the eventual decision of Justice Cardozo, so, in
the area of real property, the general rule that the vendor-builder of
real estate was immune from liability began to totter with exceptions.
In different words, the courts began to place a duty of reasonable care
upon builder-vendors6
6. Grodstein v. McGivern, 303 Pa. 555, 154 A. 794 (1931).
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In the case of Davey et al. v. Turner,7 a gas heater was not provided
with an adequate ventilation system, which thereby constituted the
nuisance per se. The court held that whereas normally an independent
contractor is not liable for injuries occurring after the completing of
the work, even if the injury occurred through a failure to properly
carry out the contract, the independent contractor would nonetheless
be liable if his defective work causes a condition constituting a nui-
sance per se.
One may ask whether the rationale for this decision should have
been limited to simple negligence rather than made on the basis of
negligence per se. But two reasons dictated against this. Firstly, this
would have required an application of a MacPherson type of negli-
gence rationale to sales of real property and, as mentioned, many
courts were reluctant to move in this direction. Secondly, proof of
negligence is not required if a nuisance per se exists since strict li-
ability is imposed on one who creates a nuisance per se. Hence, if it
can be established that the defendant is engaged in a highly dangerous
activity, such as storing or transporting explosives, any resulting in-
juries may be said to be the effect of a nuisance per se. This court,
moving conservatively, chose rather to expand the formerly limited
area of businesses which engaged in per se negligent conduct rather
than to extend the ordinary negligence of MacPherson to businesses
involved in the sale of real property.
Various exceptions to a general rule have tended to survive because
they have enabled the courts to hold the defendant liable without
stating a new general rule. A point, however, may be reached where
the numerous exceptions render the old rule no longer the general
rule. At this point, the law in any particular area becomes incon-
sistent and erratic, often leading to inequitable results. Such a ten-
dency denotes a field of law which is in a state of flux and in search
of some stability. It is suggested that one answer to the problem is to
develop a new general rule to cover the numerous exceptions which
have been developing. A small number of cases thus began to apply
the principles of the MacPherson decision to real property transac-
tions." It now appears that the ancient, pre-MacPherson approach so
long in force in the area of real property transaction is in retreat, if
7. 55 Ga. App. 786, 191 S.E. 382 (1937).
8. See Grodstein v. McGivern, 303 Pa. 555, 154 A. 794 (1931), where a contractor
was held liable for the negligent construction of the real property of plaintiff after
plaintiff fell through the loosely attached railings on a porch
411
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not defeat. The principle of ordinary negligence established by the
MacPherson decision is now the majority rule in cases involving the
sale of real property.9 It can be stated with some assurance that the
builder-vendor of real property with a new dwelling thereon is liable
for any injury resulting from a defect in which the builder-vendor
had, or should have had, knowledge. That is, he is liable for his
negligence, and has a duty to exercise reasonable care.
This rule is expressed in the 1949 Pennsylvania case of Foley
v. Pittsburgh-DesMoines Steel Co.1o This action arose out of a disaster
in which leakages from a gas tank caused the tank to collapse, igniting
free gas, thereby resulting in death to over one hundred persons. The
action was instituted by a victim's widow under the Wrongful Death
Statutes alleging negligence in design and construction by the manu-
facturer of the tank. The court concluded that one who erects a struc-
ture upon land is subject to the liability for personal injury and thus
with respect to negligence the same rules which govern manufacturers
of a chattel should apply to manufacturers of real property structures.
More recent cases have explicitly stated the analogy to MacPherson.
In Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co." the builder of a four-year-old home was
held liable for carbon monoxide deaths of members of the second
family to own the house caused by a defective gas heater. The court
analogized the facts to MacPherson and could find no reasonable dis-
tinction for holding the manufacturer of non-real property for his
negligence and allowing the manufacturer of real property to escape
liability. To the argument that defendants did not have control of
the heater, the court stated that the contractor is in full control and
is in the best position to know exactly what is to go into the house.
As the Buick Motor Co. in the MacPherson decision was held despite
the fact that a reputable manufacturer had constructed the defective
wooden wheel, the California court stated that the contractor, even
though a subcontractor may negligently intervene to create the haz-
ardous condition, is nonetheless liable since he is in full control.
One particular inconsistency which should be noted has arisen in
those jurisdictions where the MacPherson rule has been extended to
builder-vendors. The duty of care which is placed upon the owner
of real property has been traditionally limited by elaborate and com-
plex principles from the common law. The landowner has tradition-
9. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 99, at 695 (3d ed. 1964).
10. 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949).
11. 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958).
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ally owed no duty of care to a trespasser. The landlord is not re-
sponsible to his lessee to maintain safety in areas not within his
control. There is generally no duty owed to a licensee to keep the
premises safe. In fact, only to business invitees does a landowner owe
any particular duty of care. 12 The builder-vendor in those jurisdictions
which have applied the MacPherson doctrine is thus held under a
duty of care as to the item of real property where the owner of the
property has no corresponding duty. The courts have not yet faced
this issue. Whether they will continue to ignore the problem or
whether they will begin to reconcile the disparity by raising the an-
cient standard of care of the landowner will be interesting to watch.
THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR
The MacPherson decision has had a profound effect upon the li-
ability of persons involved in the sale of real property, but it should
be noted that certain jurisdictions have moved slowly, if at all, in
extending the ordinary negligence theory of the MacPherson decision
beyond personal property. These courts have generally found it diffi-
cult to analogize between a producer of a chattel such as an auto-
mobile, and a producer of realty such as a storage silo or a home. In
bolstering their conservative stance, these courts have generally em-
ployed the common law arguments supplemented by some modern and
valid policy considerations. Some of these policy considerations are
expressed in the New Jersey case of Levy v. C. Young Construction
Co.' 3 Here, a purchaser brought an action to recover cost incurred in
replacing a defective sewer line which connected the purchaser's dwell-
ing with the main line. The defendant-builder was not held in tort
since the purchaser failed to establish either an express or implied
warranty in its construction of the connecting line. The court re-
turned to the caveat emptor doctrine used so often in the frontier
areas of products liability. 4 This common-law rule, simply stated, is
12. V. PROSSER, TORTS 61, at 402 (3d ed. 1964).
13. 26 N.J. Super. 293, 134 A.2d 717 (1951).
14. See Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961), where
the court applied the rule of caveat emptor upon the policy consideration of the need
for certainty in the area of real estate law and that express warranties can be easily
stipulated if so desired by the purchaser. The court also cites 4 WsLLISTON, CONTRACTS,
§ 296 (revised edition) as stating what the doctrine of caveat emptor is in full force
in the area of real property sales. But see Humber v. Morton 426 S.W.2d 554 (1968),




that a person who purchases a dwelling does so at his own risk. The
courts rejected any contentions to the contrary, repeatedly stating that
ample opportunity is afforded everyone to observe the dwelling before
consummating the transaction.
Two reasons dictate against continuing the application of caveat
emptor in the limited area of real property sales, and particularly in
the sale of homes. Firstly, a home is simply too complex for the
average buyer to detect and understand all of the possible defects.
Many hours have been spent by architects, engineers and skilled work-
men in constructing an average house. For such reasons the doctrine
of caveat emptor has been long dispensed with in the purchase of
non-real property of complex design and manufacture as the MacPher-
son decision will attest. Secondly, it seems harsh to apply so stringent
a doctrine to an item which usually demands the greater part of the
purchaser's savings. As stated in a recent decision, "Buyers of mass
produced development homes are not on an equal footing with the
builder-vendors and are no more able to protect themselves in the
deed than are automobile purchasers in a position to protect them-
selves in a bill of sale."'15
Due to the MacPherson decision and its progeny, the doctrine of
caveat emptor has lost some of its force if the contractor has been
negligent in constructing the dwelling. The doctrine is given con-
tinued force, however, when the argument of implied warranties is
raised. To Williston, 16 cited in the Levy decision, the rule of caveat
emptor is in full force as applied to real estate transactions. One who
contracts to buy real estate generally must specify in the deed, through
an express warranty, any condition he may wish the seller to amelio-
rate. If the purchaser fails to do this, he is afforded no remedy for
breach by the vendor of any promise contained in the contract, though
omitted in the deed.
The Levy Case stated other considerations militating against the
new standard of strict liability. Were plaintiffs successful under the
facts presented, the court argued, a chaotic situation would result and
the element of uncertainty would pervade the entire field of real prop-
erty transactions. The court also employed the argument that since
control of the premises has passed entirely from the vendor to the
vendee, any attempt to place liability upon the vendor, who may have
15. Schipper v. Levitt and Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
16. 7 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 926 (3d ed. 1963).
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lost control some years prior to ultimate injury or defect, would be
unjust. The court finally ended with the admonition that to extend
strict liability to sellers of real property could lead to seemingly limit-
less liability of particular vendors. An added argument against im-
plied warranties, not advanced in the Levy decision, is that real prop-
erty admits of no clear standard of quality against which deviations
from a norm may be accurately discerned and measured. In the case
of most chattels, the article sold is of the ordinary kind of like articles.
Finally, the courts may not be able to justly designate who is and
who is not a mass-producer upon whom liability attaches. The deci-
sions to date have not been exactly clear as to whether a rule of
liability will be extended to home builders who do not mass-produce.
Nor do decisions give any numerical guidelines for determining which
builder-vendors produce the requisite number of homes to be deemed
mass-producers.
KRIEGLER: A FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
Application of principles of strict liability to sellers of personal
property and the recent decisions dispensing with privity of con-
tract have already been explained. 17 This note and the principal case
under consideration also suggest a further and more radical trend by
an extreme minority of courts toward applying either a rule of strict
liability of implied warranty to vendors of defective real property.
This runs counter to the established rule in nearly all jurisdictions that
implied warranties are not permitted in the sale of real property. The
policy considerations which have led the substantial majority of our
courts to reject the newer iule of strict liability or implied warranty
sound familiar. Many of these same reasons are still being applied by
the minority of courts which are reluctant to extend the negligent
liability principles of MacPherson to vendors of realty which have
already been considered. Whether the doctrine of privity of contract,
dispensed with in sales of personal property by the MacPherson deci-
sion, should now be added to the stringent doctrine of strict liability
in the sale of real property is a perplexing question.
It will be recalled that in the case to which this note is devoted, the
plaintiffs, were not the original purchasers from the defendant Eichler
Homes, Inc. Another family had originally purchased the newly com-
17. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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pleted dwelling and had resided in it for a period of over five years.
The problems raised by this occurrence have understandably plagued
the courts in the whole area of products liability since its inception,
and have usually been presented in the context of the principle of
privity of contract. The erosion of the principle of privity has been
"vertical," that is, allowing the injured owner to go directly against
the manufacturer and thus by-pass the intermediate wholesalers and
retailers. The MacPherson decision dispensed with this "vertical"
privity. Privity has also eroded "horizontally" thereby allowing mem-
bers of the purchaser's family and other users of the commodity to
maintain an action against the manufacturer. But the courts which
have rejected this privity requirement have not stated how far the
rejection will extend. The Kriegler decision makes no mention what-
ever of this matter. May a mailman, for example, directly sue the
builder of a twenty-year-old home on strict liability for injuries he sus-
tained due to manufacture below a given standard, though perhaps
not low enough to constitute negligence? The question remains open
after Kriegler.
Prior to the MacPherson decision, a manufacturer's negligence
would not be recognized as the proximate cause of injury to any
remote purchaser who was not in privity of contract with the manu-
facturer. MacPherson dealt only with the manufacturer who was
negligent in his manufacture of the good; what rule applied to a
manufacturer whose liability was predicated on the more stringent
principle of strict liability? MacPherson had no application in this
area and privity of contract was still required if one were suing on
strict liability. In a 1960 article, Dean Prosser foresaw that actions in
strict liability would no longer be inhibited by the requirement of
privity of contract.18 And later in that year a crushing blow was indeed
applied to the "citadel of privity" in the landmark decision of Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 9 Here, the buyer of an automobile
brought an action against the manufacturer and dealer to recover
damages sustained by his wife while driving the allegedly defective
automobile. The court held both the manufacturer and the dealer
liable without a finding of negligence or a requirement of privity
of contract. The opinion discarded the long-held policy considera-
tions which exempted only food intended for human consumption
18. Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1090 (1950).
19. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960).
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from the general requirement of privity, the court held that privity of
contract is an antiquated doctrine as applied to the mass produced
articles marketed through the high pressure advertising of the fifties
and sixties. In such an environment, the court concluded that con-
sumers should be afforded a degree of protection commensurate with
the risk of physical injury which the industries have created. 20 But
while privity is no longer the rule in cases of the manufacture of
chattels, most courts have continued to apply the rule to sales of real
property when the builder-vendor is being sought on a strict liability
theory. As has been seen, whether the distinctions between automo-
biles and finished pre-fabricated homes are valid and adequate to
justify the reluctance of the law to drop this requirement of privity
is a debatable issue.
A MORE ADEQUATE STANDARD FOR APPLYING STRICT LIABILITY
The Kriegler decision in California adopts the following rule. In
the future, the builder-vendor of a mass produced home may be found
strictly liable to subsequent purchasers. However, we have seen that
this rather broad holding leaves many questions unanswered. Other
jurisdictions, such as Pennsylvania, may be more fortunate in that a
standard may already exist to help to determine future cases with some
degree of accuracy, thereby obviating uncertainty in builders and
buyers of homes. The standard is Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts which was adopted in Pennsylvania in the 1967 case
of Webb v. Zern.21 It states:
Special liability of seller of product for physical harm to user
or consumer-
(1) one who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product and
20. The assumption underlying this policy of placing the risk upon the manufac-
turer of the chattel is that he is particularly able in paying for the injury. He can do
this, it is said, by simply raising the price of his commodity to cover the prospective
injuries calculated to occur through the commodity's use. He is also the person most
likely to have adequate liability insurance. The economics of this question are quite
complex and much debate has centered upon whether the courts, which may not be
suited for such complex decisions, should not leave the matter to the legislatures. At
any rate, the courts have so held.
21. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1967).
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(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it
is sold
(2) the rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
It will be noted that the Restatement specifically prescribes that the
builder or other vendor be in the business of selling new dwellings.
Privity of contract between the vendor and the aggrieved vendee is
not required. But neither is liability open-ended since the dwelling
must reach the vendor without "substantial change" in the condition
in which it was sold.
Section 402A of the Restatement has rarely been used in cases where
the product involved was real property. A recent Mississippi case is an
exception. In State Stove Manufacturing Co. et al. v. Hodges,22 after
a heater exploded thereby substantially destroying their house and all
personal property within, the home owners brought an action against
the manufacturer of the heater and the contractors who constructed
the home and installed the heater. Using section 402A, the court dis-
missed the action against the manufacturer of the heater since the
heater reached the vendees in a "substantially changed" condition.
The court found that the plumber who installed the heater was an
agent of the contractor and not an independent contractor, and that
he had failed to to follow the explicit directions of the manufacturer.
Although the court refused to impose liability on the manufacturer
of the heater for several other reasons, it specifically adopted § 402A
of the Restatement as applicable to a manufacturer of a product as
well as the contractor who builds and sells a dwelling. The court
went on to support its strict liability argument with various policy
considerations already outlined in this note. But conspicuously absent
from the decision is any reconciliation with the common law's reluc-
tance to impose any liability, whether based on ordinary negligence
or strict liability, upon persons engaged in the selling of real property.
PRECURSORS OF KRIEGLER
While the Restatement may afford an adequate standard, most of
the cases which have applied strict liability to real property sales have
22. 189 So. 2d 113.
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done so without its support. In a leading case, Schipper v. Levitt and
Sons,2 the court found the builder-vendor liable on the theory of
"warranty or strict liability." In this case, the developer of the home
had installed a hot water heater which was capable of heating the
water to a temperature of 210 degrees Fahrenheit. The plaintiff had
leased the house from the original purchaser. The record indicates
that the owner knew that the system lacked a heat regulator and that
he had therefore recommended to the plaintiffs that they turn the
cold water on first, slowly adjusting the hot water tap until a suitable
temperature was reached. Expert testimony disclosed that this was
quite an outdated and unsafe substitute for a heat control device. The
plaintiff-lessee's son was severely scalded by the hot water and the
action ensued to recover damages for the physical injury. The New
Jersey Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held that the
plaintiff in spite of lack of privity could proceed in his action upon
a theory of negligence, as well as strict liability or implied warranty.
The court could find no basis for distinguishing between mass-pro-
ducers of homes and mass-producers of automobiles stating that the
impelling policy considerations which led to the ordinary negligence
adopted in MacPherson are equally applicable to strict liability.
The case, however, leaves many of the same questions unanswered.
The court makes no attempt to reconcile the complex common-law
which has traditionally placed an anomalously low standard of care
upon the owner of real property, and the stringent principles of "strict
liability or implied warranty" which are now to be applied to the mass-
producer of homes. Also the court treats the tort concept of strict li-
ability and the contract concept of implied warranty as nearly synony-
mous. In the Schipper decision, the builder-vendor is to be held where
he has not been negligent, but his attorney can only guess whether
tort law is holding his client strictly liable, or whether contract law
is holding his client on an implied warranty. The result may be the
same but it seems that the uncertainty of the courts can only lead to
uncertainty in the defense attorney's briefs, and this uncertainty may
be crucial to the outcome of his case.
Some courts have corrected this problem by applying a specific
theory of liability. In the 1967 decision of Waggoner v. Midwestern
Development, Inc.,24 an action by purchasers of a new residence was
23. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A2d 314 (1965).
24. Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 154 N.W. 2d 803.
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commenced against the builder-vendor for damages resulting from
water seepage into the basement. While no problem of privity of
contract was involved, the court held that where the vendor of a house
is also the builder, there is an implied warranty of reasonable work-
manship surviving the delivery of the deed. It is recalled that the
Kriegler case also adopted a specific theory of liability-strict liability
in tort.
The court in the Schipper case does, however, adequately explain
a policy consideration which is principal in this area; that is the ability
to suffer the loss. Applied in various other terms such as the "deep
pocket" theory and spreading the risk, the court stated, "The public
interest dictates that if such injury does result from the defective con-
struction, its costs should be borne by the responsible developer who
created the danger and who is in the better economic position to bear
the loss . . ." This principle has been increasingly applied in this
century with the advent of the industrial society and particularly in
the fields of tort and agency law. It is because of this theory that the
court places great emphasis on the fact that Levitt and Sons is a "mass-
producer" of homes for he, more than smaller builder-vendors, can
bear the cost of creating the danger. But again, while the court found
Levitt to be a mass producer of homes, no adequate standard was pre-
sented to determine if other lesser firms could also be so defined. So
to date, virtually all home builders whose volume of business is
moderately heavy must remain uncertain as to how the courts will so
define them, and upon this unclear definition lie many millions of
dollars.
CONCLUSION
The Kriegler decision has thoroughly rejected the pre-MacPherson
principles of negligence and privity of contract. The California court
exhibits a method of dispensing with privity of contract by raising
the remedy in tort through the principle of strict liability. The
imposition of negligence principles on builder-vendors is predicated
upon sound policy considerations, some of which were stated by
the court. By placing liability on the party causing the negligence, this
area of the law is finally in tune with the general law of products li-
ability. The change will hopefully encourage builder-vendors to use
due care in the construction of homes. And this point is particularly
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germane in the America of the 1970's with the accelerated growth in
the population and the corresponding rise in pre-fabricated homes to
house this population. Builders should be encouraged through a re-
liable and authoritative system of laws to maintain care in construc-
tion.
To move one step beyond ordinary negligence, and to apply prin-
ciples of strict liability or implied warranty to builder-vendors of
"mass-produced" homes, however, presents problems not evinced by
the ordinary negligence principles. In ordinary negligence any
builder, whether he produces on a large scale or small scale, is held
accountable for his negligence. But the California court has limited
strict liability to the "mass-producer" of pre-fabricated homes. The
contours of this class of builders are vague indeed. Moreover, even if
the court had attempted to establish a standard which builders could
follow with certainty, it is doubtful whether the court could have
gathered the complex economic information and then to have mas-
tered it in order to make a comprehensive and knowledgeable de-
termination of the classification. In such areas, the legislatures have
the resources to make such determinations. The legislatures should
also make these resolutions where the policy considerations are par-
ticularly controversial, and the law is without case precedent.
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